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NOTES
SOVIET REPUBLICS' DEMAND FOR AUTONOMY:
THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND
THE INSTITUTION OF CANADIAN-STYLE
JUDICIAL REVIEW*
INTRODUCTION
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) purports to be a federal,
multinational state that upholds the principles of self-determination and voluntary
association of its republics. Yet, in the past several months, while its republics
have rallied for greater independence and sovereign rule, the USSR has resisted
their bids for autonomy. Despite Moscow's threats and false promises, the Union's
republics appear determined to gain control over their ethnic nations. The USSR,
faced with national disintegration, must decide whether it is willing to implement
a genuine federal system to provide the autonomy its republics demand.
Focusing on the Republic of Estonia and the foreign trade monopoly, this note
explores the issue of federalism within the USSR and suggests Canada as a model
for restructuring its federal system. Section I relates to the dilemma that the once
omnipotent Moscow faces as republics, like Estonia, take steps toward secession.
Looking at the government's foreign trade network, Section II describes how the
Union's central control prevents the republics from exercising any meaningful
authority over their affairs. Section III discusses both the ideology of a true
federation and the barriers confronting the Soviet politicians who would imple-
ment the necessary reforms. In recognition of the demographic similarities of
Canada and the USSR, the note suggests that the USSR can learn from Canada's
success in dealing with independence-minded provinces like Quebec. Section IV
examines how the existence of judicial review in Canada has played a pivotal
role in allocating federal power over foreign trade in a response to provincial
demands. Section V suggests that to achieve a genuine federation, the USSR
needs to begin systematic reform by restructuring its Constitution and establishing
a new Union treaty.
I. SOVIET DOMESTIC POLITICAL CRISIS
In accordance with the Soviet Union's attempts at political and economic
restructuring, the Union continues the battle to keep its nation intact. All but
one of the fifteen Soviet republics have formally expressed their desires to attain
greater autonomy, or even independence, from Moscow, because they view
perestroika as slow and unrealistic.' President Mikhail S. Gorbachev realizes that
* The authors wish to express their appreciation to Prof. Igor Grazin of the University of
Tartu in Estonia and Prof. John Attanasio of the Notre Dame Law School for their guidance and
assistance.
1. Every republic in the Soviet Union, except for Kirghiz, has declared some type of independ-
ence or sovereignty, defined as the right to overrule national laws. The Union of Soviet Sovereign
Republics, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 2, 1990, at 2C, col. 1.
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if he issued complete independence to even a few of these republics it would at
least create an illusion that his perestroika is failing.2 Yet, his only preventive
measures-the use of force or the issuance of economic sanctions-are doomed
to failure in the long run. Mr. Gorbachev's best solution is to negotiate a new
treaty which will allow the republics greater autonomy Within a new power
relationship. The demands of the republics will not likely subside until Moscow
effects significant and authentic changes of this nature.
A. Estonia's Aspirations for Autonomy
Technically, the USSR Constitution affords the republics significant rights,
such as the rights to control alteration of their territorial boundaries3 and to
enter into relations with other states. 4 Moreover, the Constitution officially grants
to the republics a constitutional right to freely secede from the Union.5 However,
until recently, this "right" had never been asserted by any of the republics. 6
Although the Estonian Parliament ultimately called for its independence through
secession, the Parliament initially resorted to less drastic means of professing its
sovereignty from Moscow. Lithuanian officials - like those in the neighboring
Baltic republics, Estonia and Latvia - refuse to follow the new law, saying they
were annexed in 1940 and thus are not legally bound by the Soviet Constitution.
In any case, the Lithuanians contend that the law creates so many hurdles
and gives Moscow so much leverage that it would be almost impossible for a
republic to secede if Moscow was bent on preventing it.
2. Parks, Loss Raises Questions on Perestroika, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 14, 1990, at
IC, col. 2.
3. KONST. SSSR art. 78 (1977).
4. KONST. SSSR art. 80 (1977).
5. KoNsr. SSSR art. 72 (1977). When the 1936 Constitution was drafted, Stalin raised several
of the ethnic groups from the level of Autonomous Republic to Union Republic, giving them the
formal right to secede. J.N. HAzARD, W.E. BUTLER, & PETER B. MAGoS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM:
THE LAW iN THE 1980'S 26 (1984).
6. The Soviet Constitution provides for secession, but the Communist Party has always
discouraged the concept through the use of firing squads and prison camps. Manor, Observers Mull
Future For Soviets, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 8, 1990, at IC, col. 5. When Lithuania finally
became the first republic to assert this right, President Gorbachev ruled the landmark declaration of
independence "illegal and invalid" and refused any negotiations with Lithuania over its claim of
sovereignty. Parks, supra note 2, at IC, col. 5. Soviet officials now maintain that a republic is
entitled to exercise its constitutional right to secede; however, it must first abide by a new procedural
law which requires, inter alia, a referendum on the issue. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 17, 1990, at
14A, col. 1. Technically, Lithuania declared its independence prior to the passage of this law.
Nevertheless, Gorbachev warned in April 1990, that rapid independence of Lithuania or other
republics could lead to "civil war and bloodshed" and could not be tolerated unless the republics
obeyed the new law on secession procedures. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 19, 1990, at 16A, col.
4.
The new law [(Law on the Procedure of Secession)] requires referendum approval by
two-thirds of the republic's eligible voters, a transition period of up to five years during
which the republic must satisfy the financial and territorial claims of other Soviet
jurisdictions, and final approval by the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies, a legis-
lature dominated by Russians and others opposed to Lithuanian independence.
Keller, Sole Oil Refinery in Lithuania Shut by Soviet Embargo, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1990, at A6,
col. 5. Estonian officials have refused to follow the new law, saying they were annexed in 1940 and
thus are not legally bound by the Soviet Constitution. They also contend that the law creates so
many hurdles and gives Moscow so much leverage that it would be almost impossible for a republic
to secede if Moscow was determined to prevent it. Id.
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Invoking the constitutional authority of Article 76,7 Estonia passed a con-
stitutional amendment in November, 1988, which demonstratively asserted the
sovereignty of the republic. The amendment afforded Estonia the right to refuse
to apply future Union legislation. The amendment required that all Soviet laws
and acts be endorsed by the republic's parliament before they would be recognized
as having the force of law in Estonia.' In addition, the Estonian parliament
approved a declaration which stated that its own laws had supremacy over those
of the Soviet Union. 9 In this unprecedented act of defiance, the leaders demanded
a new treaty with the Kremlin.10
In response, Soviet authorities initially invoked Article 74"1 and required
Estonia to revise the amendment because it varied from the USSR Constitution. 2
Estonia's parliament then countered by affirming its right to veto laws passed in
Moscow. 3 This conflict remains unresolved, however, for Estonia has yet to
utilize its new veto power.' 4
Estonia is still discontented with its illegal incorporation into the Soviet
Union 5 and, among other things, central control by Moscow over its international
trade. In response, the republic initiated even bolder endeavors in its movement
towards greater autonomy. In March 1990, the republic's Communist Party voted
overwhelmingly to split with the national party, but decided to use a six-month
transition period to avoid irritating Soviet authorities who strongly opposed the
move. 6 Just five days later, the Estonian republic's Parliament effectively declared
7. Article 76 recognizes a republic as a sovereign socialist state and provides for independent,
republican authority on its own territory.
8. Lodge, Estonian Parliament Defies Kremlin Constitution Plans, REUTER LiER. REP. (Nov.
16, 1988).
9. Daily Telegraph, Nov. 17, 1988.
10. Id.
11. "The laws of the USSR shall have the same force in all Union Republics. In the event of
a discrepancy between a Union Republic law and an All-Union law, the law of the USSR shall
prevail." KONST. SSSR art. 74 (1977).
12. TASS, November 19, 1988. The Presidium responded by instructing the Commission for
Legislative Proposals to look into the legality of Estonia's amendments since they affected fundamental
principles. Fundamental principles in a republican constitution must parallel those of the USSR
Constitution.
In a related matter, the Soviet Congress of Peoples' Deputies adopted a law on constitutional
compliance. The law created a committee which will "recarve" republican constitutions and bring
them into compliance with All-Union law. The legislation also includes provisions that invalidate any
law or act that violates human rights as provided for in the USSR Constitution or in international
treaties. Most of the new law's provisions became effective on January 1, 1990. TASS, Dec. 23,
1989. Parliamentary deputies from the Baltic States, including Estonia, have not supported this law,
because it infringes their rights. TASS, Dec. 22, 1989.
13. Estonian Parliament Stands Firm on Right to Veto Moscow Laws, REUTER LmR. REP. (Dec.
7, 1988).
14. Cornwall, Soviet Daily Prints Secret Clauses of Molotov-Ribbentrot Pact, REUTER LrER.
REp. (Aug. 16, 1988).
15. Estonia was forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940 along with the Baltic
republics of Lithuania and Latvia and parts of Moldavia after the foreign ministers of the USSR
and Germany, Molotov and Ribbentrot signed a secret treaty dividing Eastern Europe into spheres
of influence. Gorbachev has publicly denounced the pact.
16. Party in Estonia Votes Split and also a Delay, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1990, at A7, col. 1.
Estonia followed its fellow Baltic republic of Lithuania, whose Communist party broke with the
CPSU before the republic declared its independence from the Soviet Union on March 11, 1990. (The
declaration of independence was subsequently suspended on June 9.). The vote to establish an
independent Communist Party in Estonia was 432 to 3, with seven abstentions.
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independence from the USSR. 17 While at first Estonia approved a slower, more
deliberate path toward restoring full sovereignty,'" it adopted a different stance
a few months later. In May 1990, Estonia drafted a Declaration on the Renewal
of Independence, which emphasized that the republic has always been independ-
ent. 19 This move was designed to exempt the republic from the USSR's new
secession law which posed procedural barriers to secession. 20
B. Moscow's Predicament
Top Soviet officials realize that they must exercise extreme caution when
dealing with secession-minded republics. Many foreign leaders perceive that these
republics are only following the 1989-90 political trend of Eastern Europe, and
they would disfavor any aggressive action by Moscow which would deny these
republics their inherent right of self-determination. 2' Soviet officials must therefore
provide concrete incentives for the republics to remain as one Union. Their job
will become increasingly difficult as the nation continues to experience over-
whelming economic and social difficulties. 22 The fate of perestroika will depend
on their success in this endeavor.
Gorbachev realizes that he cannot allow Estonia to break from the Union.
He understands that his reforms will fail if Estonia secedes without punitive
action from Moscow, for this would probably be followed by the rapid secession
17. The Estonian Parliament declared Soviet rule over its territory to be illegal and began what
it described as a transition toward re-establishing its independence. On March 30, 1990, in a statement
on its own move for independence, the Estonian Parliament said in part: "The Supreme Soviet of
Estonia does not recognize the legality of state authority of the USSR on the territory of Estonia."
Clines, Moscow's Forces Seize Two Key Sites From Lithuanians, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1990, at 5,
col. 1. On March 3, 1991, the Estonian people voted overwhelmingly for independence as about 75%
backed a move to secede, with a 80-90% turnout. Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1991, at All, col. 2.
Russians, Poles, and other ethnic groups, who make up 40% of Estonia's 1.6 million people,
strongly oppose secession. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1990, at A7, col. 1. The Baltic state's large Russian
ethnic population fears persecution by the Estonian majority. They cite measures giving Estonian
primacy as the republic's language, and they express particular concern over a recent unofficial pro-
independence congress of Estonians that pointedly excluded Russians. Denver Post, Mar. 17, 1990,
at 6A, col. 4.
18. In the same proclamation, the Estonian Parliament stated: "The Supreme Soviet declares a
beginning of a period of transition that will culminate in the formation of the constitutional organs
of state power of the republic of Estonia. The restoration of the republic of Estonia has begun."
N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1990, at 5, col. 1.
19. Weller, Law. Soft Centre of an Ailing Constitution; Radical Shifts in the Balance of Legal
Power Between the Soviet Union and its Republics Could Leave the Kremlin Little to Rule Over,
INDEPENDENT (June 15, 1990) at 17. A number of essential provisions of the pre-1940 constitutions
were put back into operation. Only those parts of Soviet legislation that did not conflict with these
basic laws would continue to apply until independence was achieved. Id.
20. See supra note 6, for more detail of the Law on the Procedure of Secession.
21. The classic case of self-determination is "the international recognition of the right of the
inhabitants of a colony to choose freely their independence or association with another state." L.
HENKIN, R.C. PuOiH, 0. SCHACHTER, & H. SMr, INTERNATiONAL LAW 282 (1987).
22. In the words of President Gorbachev himself, "[t]he situation in the people's economy is
growing worse. The volume of production is decreasing and economic ties are being disrupted.
Separatism is growing. The consumers' market is devastated. The budget deficit and solvency of the
state have reached critical levels. Anti-social phenomena and the crime rate are on the rise. Life is
becoming more difficult. People are losing interest in work and confidence in the future is tumbling
down. The economy is at a very dangerous stage.... ." Excerpts From President Gorbachev's
Program for New Soviet Economy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1990, at A9, col. 1.
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of other Soviet republics.23 Furthermore, Moscow covets Estonia's geographic
location along the coast of the Baltic Sea. Much of the Soviet air defense system
is located within this coastal area, and granting Estonia independence could
significantly alter Soviet national security. The political cost to President Gor-
bachev of Estonian secession might be even greater than the criticisms he would
encounter abroad if he chose to intervene with tanks or economic coercion.2'
Gorbachev is aware that imposing force on Estonia " would jeopardize his
standing domestically and internationally. 6 On the domestic scene, a military
crackdown 27 would likely destroy all credibility the Union has attempted to earn
from its republics over the past seventy years. From a broader perspective, foreign
leaders would accuse the Soviets of aggression and of violating international law.
More importantly to perestroika, any significant military action against Estonia
would indirectly damage the Soviet Union's credit rating,2 and thereby quash
further Soviet plans to recover economically.
Gorbachev's only other alternative to keep the status quo would be to cease
deliveries of exportable goods to Estonia in an attempt to intimidate the Baltic
nation into withdrawing its aspirations for independence. This option would
damage the Estonian economy29 and also harm the Union interests in the long
run.3 At the same time, it would also be likely to impair Soviet foreign relations.
3
'
23. Opening the door to dissolution of the Soviet empire might also have a personal effect on
the President, because the Soviet political establishment and the Soviet military could remove him
from power. O'Rourke, Bush's View of Gorbachev, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 17, 1990, at IB,
col. 1.
24. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 14, 1990, at IC, col. 4.
25. Estonia presents a graver threat of Soviet military action than did Lithuania. Estonia's
population is only 60% Estonian, while Lithuania's is 92% Lithuanian. Russian-speaking people
make up at least 40% of Estonia's population of 1.6 million. These differences in ethnic concentration
could help justify bold military steps in Estonia. Dine, Baltic Trouble Could Topple Gorbachev,
Buechner Believes, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 18, 1990, at 13A, col. 3.
26. Independence, Not Anarchy, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 17, 1990, at 2B, col. 1.
27. In Moscow, some fear the possibility of martial law. Gorbachev might attempt to use troops
to open blocked roads and railways, break up strikes, and compel goods to come to market. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 20, 1990, at 14, col.2. Gorbachev personally believes that any republic's secession, even
after an elaborate referendum and negotiation process, could invite bloodshed. Clines, Gorbachev's
Plan for a New Union: A Central Government Still in Charge, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1990, at 8,
col. 2.
28. Flanigan, Bucks Will Win Over Bullets in Lithuania, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 30, 1990,
at IC, col. 1. In an attempt to ease popular complaints, the Soviets have been borrowing to import
consumer goods. The USSR has been borrowing heavily-S6 billion in both 1988 and 1989-and it
now owes at least $49 billion to Western banks. Violence in Estonia would thwart Soviet chances
for further loans, just as the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 halted Soviet access to Western capital
markets. This situation may spell the end of perestroika, the program of economic and political
change that has entered a critical period. Id.
29. Estonia's economy would be adversely affected in the short run, just as Lithuania's was
during the economic blockade initiated by Moscow in April 1990. Lithuania previously had received
75% of its energy from the Soviet Union. Besides for all of its oil and gas, Lithuania depended on
the USSR for metal, machinery, chemicals, cotton, fertilizer, repair parts, and automobiles, all of
which were vital for the functioning of the Lithuanian economy. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 16,
1990, at IA, col. 5; Apr. 14, 1990, at 8A, col. 1. The sanctions cost Lithuania a quarter of a billion
rubles in lost production. Id., May 23, 1990, at 8A, col. 3.
30. As a result of the Lithuanian economic blockade of materials such as oil and gas, many
Russian factory workers lost their jobs in forced layoffs. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 16, 1990, at
6A, col. 1. In addition, Soviet plants stopped receiving parts which were formerly manufactured in
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Accordingly, if the Kremlin is serious about keeping the Union intact, it
must seek a compromise and provide the republics with significantly greater
freedom within a restructured Soviet federation. Perhaps Moscow's best solution
would be to quickly form a loosely linked confederation or commonwealth, where
Estonia and its fellow republics would be assured of political and cultural
autonomy, as well as the freedom to trade independently in international markets.
To date, the USSR has found it difficult to relinquish such power, given the
entrenchment of Union control over the republics' activities as exemplified by
the Soviet foreign trade monopoly.
II. CENTRALIZED CONTROL IN PRACTICE: THE SOVIET FOREIGN
TRADE MONOPOLY
It is consistent with the high degree of control constitutionally afforded to
the federal government that throughout the nation the Union has historically
monopolized dominion over foreign trade. The USSR Constitution gives the
Union considerable power in the area of international commerce.32 Traditionally,
the control of the central government over trade and commerce has been so
pervasive that it permits only properly authorized Union organizations to engage
in foreign trade transactions. 3
Notwithstanding the Council of Ministers' continued jurisdiction over foreign
trade, the Soviet Union has instituted several perestroika-inspired reforms since
1986. For example, in an attempt to actively promote foreign trade, the USSR
Lithuania. The sanctions cost the Soviet Union several billion rubles in Lithuanian products that it
did not receive. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 23, 1990, at &A, col. 3.
31. Before increasing economic pressure on Lithuania, Gorbachev said himself that he was aware
that it might jeopardize relations with the United States and the West. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr.
19, 1990, at 16A, col. 3.
32. Not only does the Constitution specifically delegate to the Union jurisdiction over foreign
trade in Article 73(10), but Article 74 provides that any federal law will prevail over a law of the
republic. KONST SSSR arts. 73(10), 74 (1977).
"The jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, through its highest organs of state
power and administration, encompasses.. .representing the USSR in international relations; the
contacts of the USSR with foreign states and international organizations; establishing a general
procedure for and coordination of the relations of union republics with foreign states and international
organizations; foreign trade and other forms of foreign economic activities on the basis of the
monopoly of the state .. " KoNST SSSR art. 73(10) (1977).
"The laws of the USSR have equal force within the territory of all the union republics. In the
event of a discrepancy between the law of a union republic and all-union law, the law of the USSR
prevails." KONST SSSR art. 74 (1977).
33. MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 395. For example, the Soviet rules of foreign trade
have required that each contract made by a foreign trade organization be signed by two representatives
of the organization who have the power of attorney. This is to ensure mutual control by Soviet
officials in the realm of foreign trade. The rule has been considered imperative and to be observed
literally in all cases. OLYMPIAD S. IoFFE & PETER B. MAGos, SOVIET LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
4 (1983).
As Estonia moves towards greater autonomy, the USSR has taken measures to tighten its grip
on local organizations. In an attempt to keep enterprises subordinate to the Union and to preserve
the ditkat of central departments, last year the USSR Council of Ministers signed an order creating
a new association which made Union enterprises located on Estonian territory part of the "Integral
Association." The Integral Association is under the direct jurisdiction of the USSR. Current Digest
of the Soviet Press, Aug. 22, 1990, at 25. The decree instructed most of Estonia's main enterprises
to join the Integral Association; by gaining control of these organizations, Moscow in effect confiscates
much of Estonia's capital stock and provides the Kremlin with a powerful weapon to be used against
other independence-minded republics. INDEPENDENT, Aug. 5, 1990, at 11.
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created the State Foreign Economic Commission and extended to production
cooperatives and state enterprises the right to directly trade with foreign entities.
However, despite the liberalization of trade policies, the Union government
continues to reserve powers that allow it to maintain control of foreign trade.
A. Soviet Governmental Structure
In order to understand the republics' demand for greater independence
regarding foreign trade, it is important to understand the tight-fisted control that
the central government has historically exercised over international commerce.
The Soviet Union, presently consisting of fifteen Union republics, was created
by an international treaty in 1922. The governmental structure of the USSR
consists of a powerful, central, All-Union government and the governments of
each of the Soviet Socialist Republics. As members of the Union federation, the
republics participate in the central government through representation in various
Union governmental organs. In addition to its participation in the Union gov-
ernment, each republic also has its own governmental bureaucracy. The govern-
mental organization of the Union is very similar to that of the republics; in fact,
the republican bureaucracies replicate those of the central administration.
The Union government primarily consists of the Supreme Soviet, 34 its Pre-
sidium, 35 and the Council of Ministers. 6 Each republic has similar bodies on a
smaller scale. In the present Union governmental structure, the authority to
regulate foreign trade rests with the Council of Ministers. The Council is the
highest governmental body responsible for determining overall national economic
policy and approving the country's economic development plans.37
As mentioned, the governmental structures of the republics parallel the
organization of the Union, including the structure of foreign trade regulation. A
republic's Supreme Soviet appoints its Council of Ministers, its highest executive
and administrative body. This republican Council, which is subordinate to the
34. The Supreme Soviet, the 542-member legislature, meets eight months a year and transacts
most of the nation's business. Goldberg, A More Perfect Union Part I: A Lawyer in Moscow, 76
A.B.A. J. 59 (Oct., 1990). It is the "supreme organ of state power of the USSR" and "is empowered
to decide all questions assigned to the jurisdiction of the USSR by the present Constitution." KONST
SSSR art. 82 (1977). The Constitution vests in the Supreme Soviet the authority to adopt and amend
the Constitution, admit new republics, confirm state plans of economic and state development, and
create and pass laws. KoNsT SSSR art. 137 (1977).
The other Soviet legislature, the Congress of People's Deputies, meets annually and, inter alia,
elects one-fifth of its members to the Supreme Soviet. Goldberg, id.
35. The Supreme Soviet elects a Presidium, which acts as the effective head of State when the
legislature is not in session. The Presidium is a 33-member body which makes policy decisions. Its
vice-chairs, which are composed of the chairs. of the republic presidiums, reflect Union integration.
Decisions of the Supreme Court may be reviewed and overturned by the Presidium. KoNsT.
SSSR art. 121 (1977)(amended 1981).
36. The Supreme Soviet also elects the executive branch of government, the Council of Ministers.
W.E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 45 (1988). Like the Presidium, the Council of Ministers is accountable
to the legislative branch of government. Its primary duties include drafting legislation, issuing decrees,
and executing laws. B.B. GUPTA, CoeARATIVE STUDY OF Six LrviNo CONsTrruTIONS 184-86 (1974).
One of the constitutionally stipulated functions of the Council of Ministers is to direct foreign trade,
which is done through the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations. Butler, at 158.
37. 174 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 1696, at 8 (Sep. 23, 1987). Gorbachev's Union treaty
draft of November 1990 sought to change the Council's name to "Cabinet of Ministers." Clines,
supra note 27, at col. 3.
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Union's Council, coordinates and directs the work of the various republican
ministries, including the ministry responsible for foreign trade.38
B. Organization of the Soviet Foreign Trade System
The foreign trade system is composed of various specialized organizations
which have begun to escape from the tight control customarily exercised by the
central government. Structurally, the Council of Ministers oversees several spe-
cialized committees 39 and ministries. In turn, these ministries supervise the various
entities which each have specific responsibilities in the foreign trade hierarchy.
Traditionally, the central government has retained a great deal of control over
foreign trade. For several years, the State Committee for Foreign Economic
Relations (SCFER), which was subordinate to the Council of Ministers, admin-
istered Soviet foreign trade through its Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT).40 These
agencies historically controlled the Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs) and
Associations (FTAs) and their Foreign Trade Firms, which are the entities that
actually negotiate and conclude foreign trade transactions. 4' This hierarchy has
recently undergone a significant reorganization and has begun to loosen its grip
over foreign trade.
Recognizing the problems of a closed internal economy and attempting to
utilize the advantages of the international division of labor 42 the Soviet govern-
ment in the last decade instituted several significant reforms in the foreign trade
38. ESTONIA SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC 23-5 (1972).
39. For example, the State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN) is responsible for drawing up short-
term and long-range economic development plans, of which foreign trade is an integral part. After
consulting with various organizations, GOSPLAN devises general foreign trade plans which are given
to the Ministry directly responsible for foreign trade (e.g. the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations).
As necessary, this Ministry modifies the plan and executes it. INT'L TRADE REP., supra note 37, at
8.
40. Id.
41. Butler, supra note 36, at 383-5. FTO's are legal artifices that enable state trading. They
have a dual character; the FTO is a juridical person, but it acts in accordance with State authorization.
Each FrO is apportioned acomponent of the State foreign trade monopoly. The legal status of the
FTO can place it within either the MFER or one of its branch ministries. If FTO's are within the
system of the MFER, not only are they confirmed by the MFER, but the MFER participates on
their governing board. Foreign Trade Firms exist within FTO's and transact export-import operations
for the Fro.
The MFER and its Fro's have been perceived to be closely related, despite their legal separateness.
For example, the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission has held that the denial of a Soviet
export license by a superior agency will excuse a Foreign Trade Corporation from performance or
liability under its foreign trade contract on the grounds of force majure. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET
LAW 282 (F.J.M. Feldbrugge, ed.) (1973).
Although the FTO's can exercise some discretion over certain matters when negotiating contracts,
almost all Soviet contracts contain a provision invalidating the contract if the Fro oversteps the
authority provided to it. THOMAS W. HOYA, EEST-WEsT TRADE, COMECON LAW, AimECAN-SOviET
LAW 19, 243 (1984). As a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ("Comecon"),
FTOs typically can exercise discretion over matters that are not covered by the Comecon General
Conditions and/or pertinent bilateral trade agreements and their protocols. While there may be no
legal effect if the contract departs from the General Conditions, this does not necessarily hold true
for departures from trade agreements or protocols. Soviet jurists say that by allowing the protocol
to control, its integrity is preserved and the central planning is undisturbed. Although this may not
apply to past Soviet FTO's, partly out of a desire to prevent the disruption of relations between the
Comecon FTO negotiators, the trend is to uphold the contract. Id.
42. ABEL AGANBEGYAN, INSIE PERESTROMA: THE FuTURE OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY 173-76
(1989).
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area.43 For example, since 1986, foreign trade has been administered by the State
Foreign Economic Commission (SFEC), a new agency created to promote the
expansion of foreign trade." Although the government had relied on strong,
central control for years, the reforms began to provide local entities with greater
independence .4
Still, several republics, including Estonia, desired even greater reforms.4
Such moves towards independence appeared to pose a threat to the Union's
supremacy over its territories. Attempting to maintain Union control over the
republics, President Gorbachev called for approaches that paved the way for
experimentation, yet were still in line with the existing national constitution.
47
Regardless of the recent reforms, in reality the republics can exert only
limited authority in the area of foreign trade. Despite language in the USSR
Constitution that features the free self-determination of the republics,'4 Article
73(10) affords the Union control over foreign trade.49 A Soviet republic is
permitted to exercise its independent state authority on matters that are within
its own territory." However, matters deemed to be of great importance fall
within the jurisdictional power of the All-Union government.5 ' These include the
43. In a move toward decentralization, the government gave republican ministries responsibility
for approximately one-hundred export-import houses and authorized about one-hundred ministries
and major enterprises to trade directly with foreign firms. Quigley, Legal Implications of the
Dismantling of the Soviet Foreign Trade Monopoly, 7 INr'L TAX & Bus. L. 281 (1989). The government
also introduced a system of contracts that enabled enterprises to negotiate with import-export houses
in an attempt to make exporting through the MFER more attractive. Id. at 282. While exporting is
still done on the basis of state plans, the contracts replaced the use of production orders.
44. Id. at 281.
45. In December 1988, the Council of Ministers passed the Law on Enterprises and instituted
even greater modifications: it liberalized the Soviet rules for joint ventures, changed the valuation of
the ruble, and further reformed the Soviet trade regime. Id. at 275. Through this decree, the Union
gave every Soviet privately-owned cooperative and state-owned enterprise the right to export and
import directly.
In 1989, laws were enacted that provided significant rights to enterprises engaged in foreign
trade. As of April 1989, all organizations were afforded the right to trade on foreign markets.
Reuters News, Aug. 11, 1989. In August 1989, new legislation that amended the Law on State
Enterprises guaranteed the right to trade with foreign firms, further released industry from bureaucratic
control, and provided the right to independently carry out export-import operations. Id.
46. The Estonian prime minister recommended a "pay-your-own-way" system and updated
methods to regulate market economics. TASS, July 26, 1989.
47. Id.
48. Boats TompoRmN, Tn NEw CoNsTrruTIoN OF Tan USSR 152 (1980). See also KONST. SSSR
art. 70 (1977). Article 70 defines the Union as a "unitary, federal, multinational state formed on the
principle of socialist federalism as a result of the free self-determination of nations and the voluntary
association of equal Soviet Socialist Republics."
49. See supra note 32.
50. KoNST. SSSR art. 76 (1977). "A union republic is a sovereign Soviet socialist state which
has united itself with other Soviet republics in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Outside the
limits indicated in Article 73... a union republic independently exercises state power within its
territory." Id.
51. ESTONLA SovIET SocALwt Rapuauc, supra note 38, at 43. Although republican constitutions
and codes give the impression of broad sovereignty, this is erroneous. As asserted in Article 75 of
the Constitution, the dominion that extends throughout the territory of the USSR means that the
Union has paramount authority. Torpornin, supra note 48, at 155-6. This dominion is manifested in
the constitutional requirements that the republics' constitutions must conform to the Union Consti-
tution and that a law of the USSR prevails over a republican one in the event of a discrepancy.
KONST. SSSR arts. 74, 76 (1977).
While republican legislation is broader than its All-Union counterparts, it repeats the fundamental
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approval of economic plans and foreign trade . 2 The Union ministers, who have
authority over these areas, have constitutionally-based control over republican
ministers. 3 Therefore, the Republican Minister of Foreign Economic Relations,
who administers the foreign trade in the republic, is subordinate to the USSR
Minister of Foreign Economic Relations. 4 Accordingly, republican legislation
concerning foreign trade may be issued only if it is based and executed on the
acts of the superior agency." Although certain republican ministers are technically
part of the Union's administrative structure,5 6 control over foreign trade will
remain with the central government as long as the Union deems the republic
subordinate.
C. Foreign Trade in a Central Economy
The USSR's commitment to central economic planning and socialist owner-
ship of resources and production have motivated the central government to
control foreign trade. The present Constitution dictates that the government be
managed on the basis of a single economic complex.57 The central economy
requires that the units of this federation be tied together more firmly than in
many other federations in order to implement the concept of state planning.5
Concentration and specialization of republican resources are purposefully sought
through central planning and, in a concerted effort to facilitate the interdepend-
ence of the republics, are exchanged within the federal state. 9 Although the
USSR Constitution posits considerable cultural autonomy for the ethnic groups
constituting the republics, to achieve a successful central economy the republics'
economic programs have had to conform to a national plan.60
The Constitution has also afforded priority to the primacy of state owner-
ship.6 1 The Union not only owns the land and its resources, but it controls the
production of goods, transportation, and communication, as well. 62 Indisputably,
principles of USSR legislation verbatim. Two primary reasons account for the limited sovereignty of
republican law: constitutionally, republics cannot exercise control over areas that are vital to an
autonomous state, and republican legislation is classified as "podzakonnyi" or subordinate acts.
loffee & Maggs, supra note 33, at 46; Butler, supra note 36, at 43.
52. KONST. SSSR art. 73 (1977).
53. loffee & Maggs, supra note 33, at 24; KoNsT. SSSR arts. 137-42 (1977).
54. KONST. SSSR art. 140 (1977).
55. Butler, supra note 36, at 43.
56. The republican ministers have the opportunity to participate on a limited basis in Union
decision-making. By virtue of their office, the chairmen of the republics' Council of Ministers are
members of the USSR Council of Ministers. KoNsT. SSSR art. 129 (1977).
57. A plain reading of Article 16 presents a commitment to the principle of central economic
planning. It calls for a single economic complex that is managed on the basis of Union economic
and social development plans. While it acknowledges territorial principles and the economic inde-
pendence of operative entities, the constitutional rule requires deference to the imperatives of
maintaining a centralized leadership. See, KoNsT. SSSR arts. 16(1), (2) (1977).; F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE,
THE CoNsTrrtMONS OF THE USSR AND THE UNION REPUBLics: ANALYsIs, TExTs, REPORTS 34 (1979).
58. Hazard, Butler, & Maggs, supra note 5, at 25.
59. Parming & Jarvesoo, A Case Study of a Soviet Republic, The Estonian SSR 174 (1978).
Historically, the USSR has needed to consolidate its unity within the framework of a federal socialist
state. EsToNIA SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIc, supra note 38, at 30.
60. Parming and Jarvesoo, id.
61. Butler, supra note 36, at 147.
62. In the USSR, the economy belongs to the State. See, KONST. SSSR arts. 10-18 (1977). Land
was taken over by the State and collectivized in the late 1920's and early 1930's under Josef Stalin's
regime.
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unlimited political power accompanies such centralized control and ownership. 63
1. Positive Effects of the Foreign Trade Monopoly
Sustained by the concept of centralized control, the State (or Union) foreign
trade monopoly has endured since 19186 and has served many useful purposes.
It has permitted the USSR to fit foreign trade into economic plans and has
allowed a more precise direction of trade, including deciding which goods can
be most advantageously marketed abroad. The monopoly has allowed foreign
trade specialties to concentrate in their areas of expertise.1 It has also provided
the advantage of economies of scale and has permitted the USSR to obtain lower
prices for imports. Furthermore, central control has allowed for the easy export
of items, despite domestic shortages."6 Nonetheless, such pervasive control has
also been counterproductive.
2. Negative Effects of the Foreign Trade Monopoly
The monopoly system has produced significant adverse side-effects, namely
bureaucratic delay and the harmful separation of the foreign trade function from
the production function.67 The separation has insulated end-users from valuable
information that would have normally been shared among trade partners, and it
has impeded the introduction of foreign technology into the country." In addition,
product-specialized import-export houses have missed trading opportunities, be-
cause they have not been sufficiently aware of Soviet products that could be
marketed abroad. The inefficiency of importing at state expense has often caused
industries to receive too many or too few of an item. 69
Despite obvious problems, the Union government has not successfully re-
formed the system. Several factors have inhibited needed reform. For example,
the foreign trade monopoly concept has been deeply entrenched in the minds of
Soviet political and economic officials.70 In addition, until recently, little pressure
was placed on the system to improve its functioning, balance-of-payments con-
siderations, and the market power of such a large system.7 ' Practically speaking,
although laws and administrative actions have introduced reforms, the central
government still retains a significant amount of control over foreign trade.
D. Superficial Reforms of the Foreign Trade Monopoly
On their face, the reforms of the foreign trade monopoly appear to facilitate
the decentralization of the Moscow-based system. For example, trade contracts
63. loffee & Maggs, supra note 33, at 133. In the USSR, state ownership is a well-knit collective
body of ruling people who know that the wider their ownership, the stronger their economic might.
Likewise, the stronger their economic might, the less vulnerable their political supremacy. Id. at 156.
Under Gorbachev, however, laws have been passed which allow farmers to lease land for virtually a
lifetime, but these have stopped short of granting full private property rights. St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Sep. 18, 1990, at A9, col. 2. Gorbachev has declared that he is "resolutely against private ownership
of land." St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Dec. 4, 1990, at 12A, col. 5.
64. QuxosLEY, THE SoviET FoRaoN TRADE MONOPOLY 3 (1974).
65. Hoya, supra note 41, at 286.
66. Quigley, supra note 64, at 174-5.
67. Id. at 175.
68. Quigley, supra note 43, at 278.
69. Id.
70. Quigley, supra note 64, at 191-2.
71. Id.
1991]
248 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 17:237
can now be concluded in the republics instead of solely in Moscow. 72 In theory,
this move should be politically and economically favorable to the republics. Yet,
despite allegations of systematic reforms, a great deal of authority continues to
remain with the Union.
While the reforms indicate a shift of power to private and local entities,
certain Union control mechanisms remain. The government reserves the power
to control foreign trade through limiting or forbidding certain items to be exported
and imported,"7 licensing exports and imports deemed to be of "state impor-
tance, '" 7 4 prohibiting or restricting trade in certain products, 7 and having the
power to suspend the trade operations of a production cooperative or enterprise. 76
The Union also exercises its control through laws which require all import or
export contracts to be signed by two "properly authorized" persons. 77 Exacer-
bating this problem is vague statutory language which adds to the confusion
about who is authorized to act on behalf of the organization. 78 Presently, an
enterprise's government ministry retains the power to decide which individuals
are authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of the enterprise. In such ways,
the Union subtly retains control over the reformed foreign trade system.
In spite of the recent reforms, Soviet foreign trade practices are unlikely to
change significantly in the immediate future. Soviet economic managers have
been unable to decipher exactly what the new legislation has authorized them to
do. 79 Soviet ministries, which historically have resisted decentralization, may try
to limit enterprise autonomy and influence its trade activities.Y° Also, the export-
import houses of the MFER are likely to retain a significant role in the purchase
and sale of items in quantity, since an economy of scale is particularly advan-
tageous. 8' Nonetheless, if the Soviets were to engage in direct foreign trade
72. Quigley, supra note 43, at 289. Such contracts are governed by lex loci (the republic's civil
code). However, in reality, this is not very significant. In accordance with Soviet law, the republic
codes do not reflect a great deal of autonomy, as they incorporate the Union's fundamental principles
verbatim. Furthermore, because the republic codes are construed by courts that do not follow "stare
decisis," decisions are not binding on future cases.
73. Id. at 283. "The Council of Ministers keeps a list of items forbidden for export, and another
list of items forbidden for import. The two lists include approximately the same range of items:
weaponry, explosives, nuclear technology, precious metals... " Id.
74. Id. at 284. The Council of Ministers decides which items are of "state importance" and
compiles a list. "A cooperative or state enterprise that wishes to trade in a listed item must apply
for a license to the responsible agency as specified in the list." For example, the MFER issues licenses
for the export of oil, minerals, cotton, and grain; the only import item needing an MFER license is
construction by foreign firms that is financed by the central government. Id.
75. Id. at 285. For a defined period of time, the SFEC may take such action "if necessary to:
(1) regulate supply and demand on the Soviet market; (2) fulfill treaty obligations of the USSR; (3)
fulfill obligations undertaken by the USSR in international trade negotiations; (4) respond to
discriminatory trade measures taken against the USSR by other countries; or (5) limit trade for
balance of payments reasons." Id.
76. Id. at 285-6. For example, the SFEC can stop trade by a cooperative that engages in
"unconscionable competition" in foreign trade or in conduct harmful to "state interests." Id.
77. Id. at 292, citing The Procedure for Signing Foreign Trade Transactions, SSP SSSR 1970,
No. 6, item 35, art. 1.
78. Id. at 292-3. Since the applicable statute was promulgated before the 1988 liberalization, it
is unclear who is authorized to sign binding contracts for production cooperatives.
79. Id. at 297 (citing Rosenberg, Caution: This Bear's No Teddy Bear, AM. BANKEx, Mar. 6,
1989, at 20).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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practices-such as sending factory personnel abroad to explore trade possibilities
or encouraging foreigners to understand Soviet law-these practices could indi-
rectly, substantially benefit both Soviet politics and Soviet foreign trade in the
long run.8 2 Inevitably, the central government will be forced to surrender more
actual control to the republics and local entities.
Until recently, the Soviet economic ministries have had consummate control
over foreign trade. As reflected in the administrative precepts of the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, 3 such control allowed for the unity of political and economic
management, the conduct of all activity according to plan, and socialist legality.8
Naturally, an organization that is based on such principles effectively serves the
interests of its federal system.85 Yet, as suggested by the wave of reforms, the
USSR must respond to the republics' demand for a shift of power to the local
level. Operational autonomy of republican foreign trade organizations appears to
be irreconcilable with the USSR's traditional political system. Productive use of
these organizations requires decentralization." In accordance with affording the
republics -reater economic and political independence, the Soviet Union must
dismantle its foreign trade monopoly.
III. THE NECESSARY DEGREE OF FEDERALISM
A. The Ideal Soviet Federal System
In the hope of retaining the republics within the Union, Gorbachev has
proposed a "renewed confederation" through which these republics would achieve
some kind of "special status" within the USSR.8 These republics, though, will
not sacrifice sovereignty88 or independence unless Moscow takes overt steps to
devise and implement a genuine federal system for the USSR.
The government of a genuine 9 federal nation-state "recognizes major regional
differences while also recognizing, through a general government, the need for
common institutions and policies."9 A federal government attempts to reconcile
these differences by distributing authority between one coordinate central unit
and a number of provincial governments. 9' Accordingly, under a perfect federal
82. Id. at 297-98.
83. The Ministry of Foreign Trade was abolished in 1988. Many of its functions are now the
responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.
84. Quigley, supra note 64, at 92-94.
85. As the axiom of political and economic unity suggests, trade can be used to serve political
objectives. Id. at 92.
86. loffee & Maggs, supra note 33, at 131-34.
87. Fein, Evolution in Europe: Toughening Stand, Moscow Cuts Back Gas for Lithuania, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 20, 1990, at A6, col. 3. Gorbachev, though, did not specify what "special status"
means.
88. This term is used in the Soviet Union to mean autonomy in most internal decisions, not
independence.
89. "There can be a wide range of differences between and among federal systems; knowing
that a political system is federal does not tell us about precise structural or policy-related mechanisms
to be found in that particular system." GREGoRY S. MAHLER, NEw DEaNsxoNs oF CANADN
FEDERALISM 31 (1987).
90. A.E. SAFARW,', CANADuN FEDERALISM AND EcoNowic INTEGoAT oN 1-2 (1974).
91. Mahler, supra note 89, at 22.
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system, both levels of government possess the sovereign power to make certain
decisions independently of the other.92
Individual states that comprise federations often vary considerably in their
ethnicity, language, religious beliefs, and political ideology.'3 Despite their desires
to remain segregated along cultural lines however, collections of autonomous
states have yearned to be united for "certain purposes, because of a community
of outlook or the expectation of common benefits from union." 94
A major goal that federalism seeks to accomplish is a reasonable balance
"between national unity and subnational diversity. [T]he constitutional division
of power makes the central government and the territorial units of self-rule
coordinate rather than subordinate to each other."' 95 Under the current Soviet
system, though, Estonia's interests are subordinate to those of the Union.
If the Union is to survive, the USSR must recognize that Estonia and the
other republics demand a federation that fits the proper definition of.the term.
The republics will insist on the implementation of a system that is similar to that
presently found in Canada. Unlike the Soviet federation, the Canadian federal
system operates with much more authenticity. Canada's ten provinces exercise a
broad range of powers independently of the federal government. Effective political
authority rests with the democratically elected parliamentary majorities, organized
in political parties, at both federal and provincial levels.
Canada's governmental structure can be distinguished from the Soviet Union's
"quasi-federal" system, which lacks some of the most basic criteria of federal
systems. The simplest way to characterize the particularly Canadian brand of
federalism is to refer to it as a reasonably decentralized federal system.96 The
ruler(s) of a "decentralized" federation often can make decisions only after
obtaining the approval of the rulers of the constituent units.97 This basically
depicts the federal-state relationship of Canada, and is the type of association
the Soviet republics are demanding.
B. Political Barriers to a Renewed Soviet Confederation
In September 1990, Gorbachev nearly complied with the republics' wishes.
When faced with two competing economic reform programs-a radical proposal
drafted largely by economist Stanislav Shatalin"8 and a moderate plan proposed
by Prime Minister Nikolai I. Ryzhkov99-Gorbachev publicly supported Shatalin's
92. Id. at 21-22.
93. Id. at 28. The Soviet Union is "a collection of 15 dissimilar republics, whose inhabitants
stretch from Europe into Asia, speak different languages, use different scripts, worship different
gods, and owe greater allegiance to local heroes than to Lenin, Stalin or Mikhail Sergeevich
Gorbachev." Goodbye to the Nation State, ECONOMIST, June 23, 1990, at 11.
94. Mahler, supra note 89, at 28. Some examples of "common benefits from union" include
subsidized prices, a centralized militia, and protection of ethnic minorities in each republic from
persecution by the dominant culture.
95. Id. at 22.
96. Id. at 159.
97. Id. at 22.
98. Shatalin's plan was to begin a 500-day period of transition from the centralized command
economy to a market system. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 12, 1990, at 10A, col. 4.
99. Ryzhkov wanted to retain central control over the economy and make a much slower
transition to a market-based system. Id.
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pro-sovereignty plan.'°0 The plan would have transferred most economic authority
from the Union government to the republics.' 0' It envisioned a voluntary com-
monwealth of sovereign republics that would have moved at their own pace and
decided which powers to delegate to Moscow. 0 Among other things, the republics
were to attain authority over foreign trade.103
Ultimately, though, Gorbachev was not willing to risk the degree of shock
therapy and the surrender of economic control embodied in Shatalin's plan.1°4
Instead of forwarding much-needed sovereignty to the republics, he sought to
soften the radical plan by keeping the authority over taxation, monetary policy,
and foreign exchange in Moscow's hands.101 In the end, he convinced the Supreme
Soviet to adopt a "compromise plan," which effectively combined the proposals
by Ryzhkov and Shatalin1 °6
Dubbed "The Main Directions for Stabilization of the People's Economy
and the Transition to a Market Economy," the compromise economic reform
program ostensibly calls for dismantling the .Union's economic monopoly."07
Gorbachev's program does not, however, extend nearly as far as the republics
demand. Despite his assertions to the contrary,1es it is vague about the economic
rights and powers of republican and local governments."' 9 On the other hand,
100. In a speech before the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev told the delegates, "If you ask me, I
like the Shatalin plan better .... If there is a real plan to stabilize finances, money circulation, the
ruble and the market, then we should adopt the Shatalin idea." Id. at col. 5.
101. Id. at IA, col. 2.
102. Keller, Evolution in Europe: Gorbachev Offers His Plan to Remake Soviet Economy, But
Includes No Timetable, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1990, at A9, col. 5.
103. Clines, supra note 27, at col. 1.
104. Keller, supra note 102, at Ag, col. 3. Other risks, according to the plan's critics, included
rocketing inflation and large-scale unemployment, economic chaos, and political anarchy. Shatalin's
plan also encountered some resistance from the military and the K.G.B. Id.
In retrospect, the rejection of the "500 day plan" by Gorbachev was a politically decisive move,
marking a significant shift to right wing politics. Since early October, 1990, Mr. Gorbachev has
surrounded himself with a new team of tough apparatchiks and started a campaign to restore central
control over the Russian federation and the other secessionist republics, the chaotic economy, the
crime-ridden streets, the anarchic politics, and the press. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1991, at A4, col. 2.
Ever since Gorbachev opted for the illusory safety of the status quo by rejecting the Shatalin plan,
perestroika-type reform has been in reverse: Glasnost is in retreat, most liberals who once surrounded
Gorbachev-including Eduard Shevardnadze, his chosen foreign minister-have abandoned him, and
Gorbachev has been relying ever more visibly on the army, the K.G.B. and the Communist Party.
Going Yeltsin's Way, EcoNoaisT Mar. 23, 1991, at 13.
105. Broder, Which Tragic Figure Will Gorbachev Be?, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 28, 1990,
at 3C, col. I.
106. The Supreme Soviet voted 333-12, with nine abstentions, in favor of Gorbachev's plan to
free most prices of government control, to end most government monopolies, and to encourage free
enterprise. Keller, Gorbachev's Economic Plan Is Approved, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1990, at Al, col.
6.
107. N.Y. Times, supra note 102, at Al, col. 6. The republics are to set the pace for deregulating
prices, transferring state enterprises and farms into private hands, and governing wages and social
security. N.Y. Times, supra note 106, at A6, col. 1.
108. In his speech on October 19 to the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev spoke of the unprecedented
rights his plan afforded the republics: "For the first time, the republics are being given such broad
rights, including in the area of property, prices and incomes, social protections of citizens, formation
and use of the budget, development of the credit system, and many other things.... ." Excerpts
From Gorbachev's Speech On Making Economic Plan Work, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1990, at 6, col.
5.
109. Keller, Soviet Plan in the Middle, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1990, at Al, col. 3; see also Keller,
supra note 102, at Al, col. 6. For example, the compromise plan retains Union control over export
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the plan is more clear on what powers the Union government will retain. 10 The
success of Gorbachev's program largely depends on republican officials, who
must enact it through local legislation. However, if the plan is not further
modified toward decentralization, these officials are unlikely to cooperate.
Moreover, any plan that lacks the blessing of Boris N. Yeltsin, president of
the Russian republic, will likely encounter popular resistance. Mr. Yeltsin, ar-
guably the most trusted man in the Soviet Union at this time,"' has described
Gorbachev's reform program as a "catastrophe," which will drive up prices and
the budget deficit and decrease the ruble's purchasing power." 2 Of course, these
effects may be unavoidable under any reform plan as the Soviet Union transfers
to a free market. But Yeltsin believes that a plan with such side-effects will not
win the necessary public support unless Moscow turns over more power to the
republics in the process."'
Soviet economists have said that future cooperation between Yeltsin and
Gorbachev is crucial to solving the nation's economic problems.' 4 In short, they
must agree on the definition of this "renewed confederation" and together specify
what "special status" the republics will actually receive. Cooperation of this
nature, if attained, may help prevent a disintegration of the Soviet Union.
IV. CANADA AS A MODEL FOR A NEW SOVIET CONFEDERATION
Canada is a logical choice for a Soviet model, because both nations are
closely comparable in terms of geographic size and ethnic diversity. Amidst the
Canadian confederation, the ten provinces possess unusual flexibility in foreign
of natural riches like oil, gold, and diamonds. But several republics insist that these resources belong
to them. The Union government must ultimately negotiate with the republics about the control and
profits from these key commodities. Keller, Proposal By Gorbachev Wins Committee Votes, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1990, at A4, col. 3.
110. The Union government would retain control of transportation, communication, defense
industries, energy, credit and monetary policy, customs, and price regulation. Economic policies
would be overseen by a committee with representatives of the republics. Keller, supra note 102, at
Al, col. 6.
111. N.Y. Times, supra note 109, at A4, col. 1. Yeltsin has been Gorbachev's chief political rival
for more than a year, and he consistently ranks above Gorbachev in public opinion polls. St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Nov. 17, 1990, at 10A, col. 2. A Moscow News poll showed that Gorbachev's approval
rating plummeted from 52% to 21% over the course of 1990. Trimble, Stangun, & Corwin, Death
of a Nation, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Nov. 19, 1990, at 39.
Furthermore, Yeltsin has a mandate from the people that Gorbachev lacks. First elected as
Communist Party general secretary in 1985 by a small circle of Communist leaders, Gorbachev has
yet to stand for popular election. Without an opponent, he was then elected to a five-year term as
president of the nation by the Congress of People's Deputies. Yeltsin, on the other hand, has won
two stunning landslides in popular elections. He won 80% of the vote for a seat in the national
Congress from Moscow in 1989 and again when he ran for the Russian parliament. Mitchell, Battle
of Titans is Shaping Up, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 31, 1990, at IC, col. 2.
112. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 6, 1990, at 12A, col. 3.
113. Keller, supra note 102, at A9, col. 6. Yeltsin believes that the Union should retain jurisdiction
over areas like state security and defense. INDEPENDENT, May 31, 1990, at 1. He also thinks, however,
that the republics need to attain control over natural resources, banking, taxation, budgets, and
international trade. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 14, 1990, at I IA, col. 4.
114. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 13, 1990, at 8A, col. 2. In an open letter published November
15, 1990, several Soviet intellectuals told Gorbachev that an agreement between him and Yeltsin
would be a big step to keeping the nation intact at a time when most republics want to cut their
links with the center.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 16, 1990, at 16A, col. 1.
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trade."' The provinces appreciate Canada's historic allegiance to judicial review,
which over time has strengthened and protected their position vis-a-vis the federal
government, despite a constitution originally drafted to create a strong central
government. Unlike the present Soviet system, the Canadian system uses its
judicial branch to respond to the needs and desires of its member states. As a
result, the nation has remained intact with little dissention" 6 for over 120 years.
Similarly, the Soviet Union needs to create for its republics a constitutional
right to trade in international markets independently of the central government.
To protect this right in future years, the Soviet system must increase the influence
of its judicial branch by authorizing its Supreme Court to integrate an aggressive
approach to judicial review. Such an emergence of the Supreme Court will serve
to curb any future abuses that may arise from a more conservative Supreme
Soviet or the new dictatorial power given to the president.
A. Demographic Similarities
Canada and the Soviet Union are similar in that both have diverse ethnic
populations and language barriers within their borders. In addition, both countries
have been molded by conquest, not consent. History shows that people bound
together by conquest learn to voluntarily live with each other only if a national
identity emerges that is stronger than their sub-national identities." 7
Rather than be daunted by ethnic unrest, Canada has remained distinct
among federations by recognizing its cultural dualism. The dualism of culture
has been slowly woven into the political fabric of the nation since 1867.' 8 Like
Estonia, the Canadian province of Quebec has been a force to be reckoned with
by its federal government. Quebeckers have wished to maintain their "French-
ness" and deflect all English influences, whether they be British, American, or
Canadian. In this desire to assert their identity, Quebeckers differ little from
Estonians, or from people of any of the other rebellious Soviet republics." 9 Both
Estonia and Quebec have fought for genuine federalism to protect their own
115. In almost all federal states, the central government has maintained exclusive control over
international trade. Canada, though, has acted differently. Its central government has a flexible policy
in the field of international relations, and it allows freedom of action on the international scene to
their provinces. After a province negotiates directly with a foreign firm and reaches an agreement,
federal approval is then given, usually by means of a diplomatic note to the foreign government.
Cadieux, Quebec in World Affairs, in CANA~iA FEDERALisM: MYTH OR REA.rry 379, 382-84 (1968).
116. The Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec has been holding
meetings to decide whether the province of Quebec should renew its federal ties to Canada or seek
some form of independence. Hous. Chronicle, Nov. 9, 1990, at 28A, col. 1. The Commission was
created in September 1990 as Quebec's answer to Canada's failure to approve the Meech Lake
Accord. The Accord was a package of constitutional amendments that would have incorporated
Quebec into the 1982 Constitution (which Quebec has never signed). The pact died June 23, 1990,
after it failed to win unanimous support from the provinces, mostly because of its provision granting
Quebec's demand to be recognized as a "distinct society." Id.
117. Goodbye to the Nation State, supra note 93, at 11. With respect to the USSR, "[i]t is Mr.
Gorbachev's misfortune that his republics neither came together voluntarily, surrendering sovereignty
in the process, as the American colonies did, nor are they cemented by a central idea that has any
enduring appeal." id. As a result, not many wish to put the Soviet Union's identity above their own
republic's.
118. Brady, Quebec and Canadian Federalism, in CANADiAN FEDERALISM: MYTH oR REAL 337
(1968).
119. Goodbye to the Nation State, supra note 93, at 11.
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cultures. Their tactics range from insisting that their native languages be used in
the conduct of government affairs to demanding sufficient autonomy.1'
B. Judicial Review: Offering the Potential to Transform a Nation Into a
Looser Confederation.
In the hierarchy of Soviet law, constitutional law and its amending legislation
rank the highest. Although the USSR has a Supreme Court, the constitutionality
of laws passed by All-Union bodies escapes judicial review. Despite a provision
in the Constitution for appeal of these laws, there is no procedure for constitu-
tional control.' 2' The lack of judicial review has provided the Union government
with a great deal of power and has left the republics powerless to challenge any
executive and legislative actions that they have found unconstitutional.
Unlike in the Soviet Union, judicial interpretation in Canada has been an
important source of its constitutional law.' 22 Over time, Canada's judiciary has
played a significant role in shaping the power and jurisdictional relationship
between Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Judicial institutions-including
provincial courts, the Supreme Court of Canada, 23 and the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council (which no longer has jurisdiction)' 24-have gradually ex-
panded provincial powers. They have done this through interpretations of Section
92 Clause 13125 of the British North America ("BNA") Act. Similarly, they have
limited the federal powers implied in Section 91 of the same constitution. 2 6
Canada's balance of power today sharply differs from what the framers of
the BNA Act contemplated in 1867. The Canadian Founding Fathers originally
planned a strong central government. In fact, the language of the BNA Act gives
the provinces only certain enumerated powers to make laws, granting the residue
of power to the'federal Parliament. 27 Judicial interpretation of Canada's
120. Brady, supra note 118, at 337-8.
121. Butler, supra note 36, at 161; see also Goldberg, supra note 34, at 64. A newly-formed
Committee for Constitutional Supervision can enjoin certain laws if they conflict with the 1977
Constitution. But that is not nearly the same as a court that can hear actual cases in controversy.
Id.
122. Butler, supra note 36, at 161.
123. The Supreme Court of Canada was not developed until 1875, and even then it did not
become the highest court in the Canadian judicial system. ALEXANDER SmTH,. TH-E COmmERCE POWER
[N CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 27 (1963). Instead, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
(in Britain) remained as Canada's court of last resort until 1949. Mahler, supra note 89, at 35.
Today, the Supreme Court is the "highest court in the land," with appellate jurisdiction in all civil
and criminal cases.
124. Up until the passage of the British North America Act of 1949, the Privy Council could
hear cases on appeal directly from the provincial courts, bypassing the Supreme Court completely.
Id. Not only was this process cumbersome, but it seemed imprudent, for Canada faced the anomaly
of having judges trained in British law and its role in a unitary state trying to comprehend and
interpret the nature of Canadian conditions and the evolving pattern of Canadian federalism. Id.
This system ceased in 1949, when cases no longer could be appealed from the Supreme Court of
Canada to the Judicial Committee.
125. CoNs1rTUiioN ACT, § 92, cl. 13 (1867). "In each Province the Legislature may exclusively
make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subject next herein-after enumerated;
that is to say,. . .(13) Property and Civil Rights in the Province ..
126. See infra note 130.
127. PETER W. Hooo, CONSTTTONAL LAW OF CANADA 86-7 (1985).
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Constitution'2 has, however, gradually redefined the division of powers between
the federal government and the Canadian provinces.'2
The Canadian Constitution distributes powers and responsibilities through
two lists of categories: one list for the federal parliament and the other for each
of the provincial legislatures. Section 91 of the BNA Act enumerates the powers
of the federal government, and most noteworthy is the central control over "the
regulation of trade and commerce."' 30 Concurrently, section 92 provides the
provincial legislatures with power over "property and civil rights in the province"''
and "generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the province."' 13 2
Over time, provinces sought to expand their authority and challenged the federal
control over trade and commerce on constitutional grounds. In response, the
Canadian judicial system has had to perform the rather difficult task of inter-
preting the Constitution by assessing the competing federal and provincial powers.
Certain commercial transactions can bring the two sections into conflict.,
From a literal reading of the text of section 91(2), the Canadian Federal
Parliament has the power to regulate "trade and commerce" without qualifica-
tion.'1 Yet, as Lord Atkinson stated in Montreal v. Montreal Street Ry.,13S this
128. In contrast to the Constitution of the USSR, the 'living' Constitution of Canada cannot be
found in a single document. It consists of a series of written documents, judicial pronouncements,
unwritten customs and usages, and other sources. Of the written documents, by -far the most
important are the British North American Act (later renamed the Constitution Act), passed by the
British Parliament in 1867, its amendments, the Constitution Act of 1982 and the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.
Despite the 1982 implementation of a new constitution, the text of the BNA Act of 1867 still
comprises the bulk of what we today know as the Canadian Constitution.
129. After more than a century of Privy Council and Supreme Court decisions, the Constitution's
distribution of powers is "much less favourable to the federal power than would be suggested merely
by comparing the text with that of the United States or Australian Constitutions." Hogg, supra note
127, at 89-90.
130. CONsTTmON ACT § 91(2) (1867). This Act also provides:
It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate
and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order and good Government
of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this
Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty,
but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is
hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative
Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes
of Subjects next herein-after enumerated; [including]... The Regulation of Trade and
Commerce....
And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this
Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters of a local or private
Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned
exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces. Id.
131. Id. at § 92(13). See supra note 125.
132. Id. at 92(16).
133. For purposes of this Note, we are principally concerned with the problem created by granting
federal authority over the regulation of trade and commerce, while simultaneously reserving to the
provinces the power over matters of property and civil rights in the province.
134. Hogg, supra note 127, at 87. By contrast, the United States Congress had been granted the
more limited authority to regulate "commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and
with the Indian tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In the same vein, whereas the BNA Act
provides the provincial governments with enumerated powers and leaves the residuary powers in the
central Parliament, the Tenth Amendment 6f the Unites States Constitution reserved powers not
delegated to the federal government "to the States respectively or to the people." These differences
are not coincidental. The founders of the BNA Act fashioned the commerce clause as a great
instrument of centralization. Smith, supra note 123, at 176.
135. A.C. 333, 344, 1 D.L.R. 681, 687 (1912).
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power, taken in its widest sense, "would authorize legislation by the Parliament
of Canada in respect of several of the matters specifically enumerated in s. 92,
and would seriously encroach upon the autonomy of the province." Accordingly,
nearly any federal use of the commerce power was countered with the charge
that such use invaded the provincial power over "property and civil rights," or
that it was a matter of a "merely local or private nature in the provinces."' 3 6
As a result, Canadian courts have invalidated much of the social and economic
legislation passed under Parliament's commerce power as encroaching on provin-
cial rights.'3 7
In the early part of the Canadian federation, the Privy Council decided
several "trade and commerce" cases and interpreted the federal-provincial con-
flicts that arose from the BNA Act. Original high-court cases granted exclusive
power to the federal government with respect to interprovincial and foreign trade
matters. Soon thereafter, though, the Privy Council began to increase provincial
power over trade and commerce.
According to the Council's reasoning, the provinces' authority over trade
stemmed from their constitutional jurisdiction over matters of "property and
civil rights." In Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons,3 the Council
set a precedent for the further development of provincial control in the area of
trade and commerce."a9 For the first time, the Lords held that "property and
civil rights" in the provinces included rights arising from contracts.140 The Parsons
decision greatly increased provincial power, because it meant that if there was
trade in a province it included the province's "property and civil rights."
Therefore, Canada's highest court arguably allowed the provinces to maintain
jurisdiction over any activity that involved a contract, including, of course,
domestic and foreign trade. 4'
The Parsons case demonstrates how an active Supreme Court can prevent
unrest from developing among a federation's member states. When such member
states are denied, for a prolonged period of time, freedom to participate in their
economic and political undertakings, they find the options of seeking independ-
136. RicHARD E. JOHNSTON, THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL RE IEW ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN
AusTRAU.A, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 233 (1969). See also, supra note 125.
137. Johnston, supra note 136, at 246. Such legislation includes the following:
... legislation for the abolition of the liquor traffic, regulation of "through traffic"
over provincial and Dominion railways, prohibition of monopolies and fixing of max-
imum prices of commodities, regulation of the grain trade and of the business of grain
dealers, regulating egg sales and deliveries within a province, regulating market trans-
actions in natural products, validation of agreements between persons in industry as to
competition in trade within a province, regulating the licensing of fish canneries and
fish processing, regulation of the business of non-Dominion insurance companies,
regulations to prevent strikes and lockouts and for settlement of industrial disputes,
and regulations relating to minimum wages and limitations of hours of labor.
Id. at 246-7.
138. 7 A.C. 96 (1881). The validity of the Ontario Fire Insurance Policy Act was at issue in
Parsons. The Council needed to decide whether the regulation of insurance contracts was a federal
matter of "regulation of trade and commerce" or a provincial matter of "property and civil rights
in the province."
139. Mahler, supra note 89, at 37.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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ence and engaging in civil war increasingly more appealing. Such has been the
case with the Soviet republics. To prevent a complete dissolution of the Union,
therefore, Soviet officials must expeditiously allow the Soviet judiciary to seize
the power of judicial review as John Marshall did in Marbury v. Madison.142
Not only will this political move establish an avenue through which the republics
can be heard, but it will provide them an attractive alternative to the risky
endeavor of declaring independence from the Union.
The beauty of the Canadian system lies in its flexibility, derived primarily
from judicial review. This is precisely why the Soviet Union must develop its
Supreme Court's role in settling disputes between Moscow and the republics. The
Canadian framers originally thought the nation needed a strong central govern-
ment. Yet, over time, the demographically diverse provinces demanded otherwise,
and gradually the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of Canada provided
them with increasing powers vis-a-vis the federal government. If not for its
flexible and progressive judicial branch, Canada may not have survived this many
years. Along a similar vein, although the drafters of the original 1917 Soviet
Constitution envisioned a centrally controlled system that would govern forever,
the member republics have since threatened secession if decentralization is not
attained. If Soviet officials neglect to follow the Canadian example discussed
here, the federation will face imminent danger of destruction.
Confronted with the threat of national disintegration, the Soviet Union must
permit its Supreme Court to hear actual cases in controversy that involve issues
of federalism. For instance, it should allow the Supreme Court to disentangle
the competing Articles 73(10) and 76 of the 1977 USSR Constitution, much like
the Canadian high courts have done with Sections 91(2) and 92(13) of the BNA
Act.
Let us suppose, for example, that Estonia strongly desires to seize full control
over the extraction and export of its plentiful shale reserves. Under the current
system, Estonia has no legal means through which it can wrest control from the
central government of the natural and industrial resources within its boundaries.
If, however, the Supreme Court was empowered to hear actual cases in contro-
versy, an enterprise from Estonia could appear before the high court and argue
that, by virtue of Article 76,41 the republic has independent jurisdiction over the
use and trade of all natural resources "within its territory." The prospect of a
continued Soviet federation would be enhanced if the republics could gradually
attain control over their respective natural resources in this manner.
The emergence of a Soviet Supreme Court with judicial review authority will
also protect the republics from the extraordinary powers now bestowed upon
President Gorbachev.'" The Supreme Soviet voted to consolidate executive power
in one set of hands, and in doing so, effectively rendered the republics powerless
142. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
143. See supra note 50.
144. On September 24, 1990, the Supreme Soviet voted 305-46, with 41 abstentions, to delegate
sweeping powers to Gorbachev to rule by decree and take personal control of virtually all sectors of
the national economy and public order. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 28, 1990, at IC, col. 2. Yeltsin
declared that Gorbachev's receipt of additional powers was "unacceptable," because it would allow
him to infringe on the republics' sovereignty. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 25, 1990, at 12A, col.
2.
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to attack an unconstitutional order issued by Gorbachev. Furthermore, given the
present pro-Union state of the Soviet Constitution, Gorbachev can issue many
decrees which would discriminate against the republics, yet remain technically
constitutional. 145 Hence, before judicial review can be effective in the USSR,
reform must begin with modification of the 1977 Brezhnev Constitution.
V. THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRUCTURING
Following the demise of the Communist Party, genuine reform should begin
with restructuring the Soviet Constitution. In the hierarchy of Soviet law, con-
stitutions rank highest, as they are "fundamental law."' Nevertheless, while the
Union Constitution has been the supreme legal norm, the Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union ("CPSU") has traditionally exerted the
greatest influence over the nation. Co-existing with the written Constitution was
an unwritten one; controlling law could be found in secret instructions from
Communist Party leaders as well as in unwritten rules of custom. 147 The Consti-
tution was the supreme law of the land only if there was parallel existence
between state law and Party law. Any conflict between the two was resolved in
favor of the law of the CPSU. 148
Through a constitutional amendment of Article 6149 in March 1990, the
Party's monopoly on the country's leadership was eliminated. With the CPSU
effectively rendered powerless over the execution of law, the remaining text of
the Union Constitution should accordingly take on new meaning, i.e. as the
unqualified source of Soviet law. Yet, the Constitution will regain influence only
if new drafters delete current inconsistencies in its language and create significant
republican powers that cannot be trumped by central authorities. Thereafter, if
the Soviet Union wants to advance its goal toward a genuine federal system, it
must revere its constitution as the pinnacle of Soviet law and structure the
executive and judicial branches around it.
In late 1989, Gorbachev appointed a group of scholars, party officials, and
legislators to draft a new constitution.'" This constitution needs to be completed
145. On September 27, 1990, Gorbachev issued his first decree under the enhanced powers,
threatening businesses with fines unless they fulfilled supply contracts to government retailers. The
decree gave government ministries a month to restore normal production of goods. Enterprises that
failed to meet their contractual obligations faced fines of up to 50% of the cost of undelivered
supplies. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 28, 1990, at IC, col. 2. At this point in time Gorbachev is
not constitutionally barred from issuing such a decree.
146. MODERN LEGAL SYSTM CYCLOPEDIA 42.
147. loffee and Maggs, supra note 33, at 15.
148. MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYcLOPEDIA 340.
149. Article 6 has historically provided:
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union shall be the guiding and directing force
of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system and of State and social
organizations. The CPSU shall exist for the people and shall serve the people.
Armed with Marxist-Leninist teaching, the Communist Party shall determine the
general perspective for the development of society and the internal and foreign policy
line of the USSR, direct the great creative activity of the Soviet people, and impart a
planned, scientifically well-founded character to its struggle for the triumph of com-
munism.
All Party organizations shall operate within the framework of the USSR Constitution.
150. Goldberg, supra note 34, at 62.
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and implemented rapidly, and unlike its predecessors, it must prescribe actual
rights and powers. Obviously, in accordance with the national trend toward
decentralization, it must remove Article 74,151 which allows any federal law to
prevail over a republican law. To increase the likelihood of prolonged national
cohesiveness, Soviet legislators should also expand republican jurisdiction by
adding an enumerated list of powers to Article 76. In reality, though, this process
of revision will take many months, if not years, to complete.
Because no one expects to see a finished constitutional product anytime
soon, a more immediate priority is the drafting of a new Union treaty-the first
since 1922-that will redistribute powers between the republics and Moscow. The
original treaty failed to establish a genuine federal system, because it gave the
Union virtually unlimited power over economic planning, education, legislation,
foreign relations, defense, transportation, and emigration.5 2 Obviously, the new
treaty will have to transform the nation into a confederation of sovereign
republics, and in doing so, it must respond to republican demands for increased
local control of the nation's wealth.
On November 24, 1990, Gorbachev offered the republics a draft treaty which
he proclaimed gave greater sovereignty to the republics. Realistically, the draft
guaranteed no reduction of the central government's powers. For this reason a
majority of republics rejected it immediately." Under Gorbachev's draft, Union
laws would have continued to take precedence over resolutions passed in major
republics that had proclaimed their own laws as dominant."' Moreover, the
central government would have kept the nation's gold and diamond reserves
while using them "in agreement" with the republics. 5  This latter provision
deviated dramatically from the republics' demands for increased control over the
export of natural resources extracted from their territories.
Gorbachev's next attempt at a draft treaty will have to reserve greater powers
for the republics. He must recognize that superficial reforms, such as those of
the foreign trade monopoly, will not suffice in this age of republican revival.
The two levels of government can coexist only if the new Union treaty eliminates
federal domination, introduces bona fide republican powers, and allows the
governments to coordinate rather than subordinate to each other.
CONCLUSION
In light of the republics' official actions toward sovereignty and independ-
ence, Soviet officials should take immediate steps to decentralize Union control
over republican governments. In doing so, they must win the political cooperation
of the fifteen republics by achieving a balance between national unity and
subnational diversity. To maintain its vitality as a country, the Soviet Union
must respond to the republics' reasonable demands: authentic reforms and the
151. KONST. SSSR art. 74 (1977). ("The laws of the USSR have equal force within the territory
of all the union republics. In the event of a discrepancy between the law of a union republic and
all-union law, the law of the USSR prevails.").
152. Goldberg, A More Perfect Union Part II: The Center Cannot Hold, 76 A.B.A. J. 73 (Nov.
1990).
153. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 25, 1990, at IA, col. 2.
154. Clines, supra note 27, at 8, col. 1.
155. Id.
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dismantling of its suffocating foreign trade monopoly. Through its effective
utilization of judicial review, the Canadian federation has shown that it is possible
to both maintain a degree of federal control and provide its provinces with
autonomy over foreign trade and other areas. Before the Soviet Union can enact
a similar system of judicial review, it must initiate legislative reform to eliminate
constitutional provisions that undermine the republics' authority and to establish
enumerated republican powers. National disintegration can be avoided only by
the establishment of a new power relationship which will provide the republics
with nothing less than the benefits of the genuine federation currently enjoyed
by Canadian provinces.
John C. Blase'"
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